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Correspondence
“Who Pays the Income Taxes?”
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:

Sir: In masses of figures, plain facts often escape attention. The
following simple graph and concise tabulation of facts and figures on
personal returns of net income for the year 1921, present a clear picture
that may be useful in shaping governmental policies respecting a reduction
of income taxes.
The data used will be found principally on page 40 in the book issued
recently by the treasury department, Statistics of Income from Returns of
Net Income for the Year 1921.
The entire amount of income taxes on personal returns in the year
1921 ($719,387,106) was paid by less than 3½% (3.38%) of the total
population; and 16/100th of 1% of the total population, reporting taxable
incomes of $10,000.00 and over, paid over three-fourths (77.53%) of the
personal taxes collected.
Attention is also directed to the fact that out of the whole number
of returns filed (6,662,176), nearly one-half of such returns (3,072,191)
were relieved from payment of taxes because of specific exemptions in
excess of income reported. In other words, for every $3.00 of net income
reported, $1.00 was exempted from taxation.
Would it be just to make the small number of citizens (3,589,985)
who now carry the burden of all the personal income taxes, also carry an
added burden of taxation for a soldiers’ bonus?
Our soldiers fought presumably for the entire population of the United
States and not solely for the 3.38% of the total population that now pays
all the taxes collected on personal incomes.
During the war it was “everybody’s job” to buy Liberty bonds. If a
soldiers’ bonus is just, should not it be “everybody’s job” to pay for it
other than by the present form of income taxation that affects less than
3½% of the population?
Yours truly,
Shepard E. Barry.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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“Income Taxation”
The Journal is glad to publish the following letter addressed by a
prominent member of the Institute to the acting chairman of the com
mittee on ways and means under date of November 26, 1923:
Hon. William R. Green, Acting Chairman,
Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Green :
Having been a student of taxation for many years and having had
the opportunity in various capacities to acquire some familiarity with
the actual working of the income-tax laws, I venture to write you in
advocacy of the programme recently outlined by Secretary Mellon.
Many of the suggestions contained in the secretary’s letter will, I imagine,
be immediately understood and approved. The reasons underlying the
suggested rearrangement of surtaxes on the higher incomes are,
however, probably less generally appreciated, and I would like to
submit some considerations bearing particularly on that recommendation
The argument that the high surtaxes divert capital from productive
industry and encourage municipal extravagance by unduly stimulating
the market for tax-exempt securities is unquestionably sound. It is,
however, becoming of less relative importance for the reason that tax
avoidance is growing more rapidly and is less limited in scope than tax
exemption. I believe the time has come when justice to the earners
who cannot resort to tax avoidance, and to those possessors of invest
ment income who do not resort to it, requires either that the present
extreme surtaxes shall be made generally effective or, if that be impos
sible, as it has proved to be up to the present, that the rates shall be
reduced to a point where substantial enforcement becomes practicable.
It is difficult to arrive at definite conclusions regarding the extent
of tax avoidance, especially as its effect is obscured by the increase in
taxable income resulting from the rise in price levels and other causes
since the high surtaxes were first imposed. Moreover, the latest sta
tistics available are those for 1921, and tax avoidance has extended
greatly since that time. In tables attached hereto I submit some com
parative figures which throw light on the question, and I would
particularly draw your attention to the following facts.
Incomes over $100,000 constituted 29.5 per cent. of the total income
reported in 1916, and 5.4 per cent. and 4.5 per cent. in 1920 and 1921
respectively—returns under $3,000 being eliminated in all cases so as to
make the figures fairly comparable. If all salaries and wages be
omitted the percentages for the three years become 36.0 per cent., 9.1 per
cent. and 8.3 per cent. respectively.
The income from business, professions, etc., reported in classes
over $100,000 fell from 862 millions, or over 25 per cent. of the whole,
in 1916 to 260 millions, or about 5½ per cent. in 1920, and to 136
millions, or 4½ per cent. of the whole, in 1921.
Dividends reported in classes over $100,000 fell from 944 millions,
or roughly 44 per cent. of the whole in 1916, to 465 millions, or 18 per
cent., in 1920, and 332 millions, or 15 per cent., in 1921.
Rents and royalties remained substantially unchanged in total but
the amount reported in classes over $100,000 fell off 60 per cent. in 1920,
and 70 per cent. in 1921 as compared with 1916.
Even salaries showed a falling off in the higher groups in 1920 and
1921 as compared with 1916, and though this falling off is not so marked
as in the cases of business incomes, dividends, rents and royalties, it is
sufficiently striking in view of the fact that the total salaries and wages
reported in all classes increased in the same period some four- or
five-fold.
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Thus a striking reduction is seen under every head and I believe
the conclusion is fully warranted that the taxable income reported today
in the highest surtax groups is not more than between 10 and 20 per
cent. of what it would be but for tax exemption and deliberate tax
avoidance. If earned income could be excluded from the computation
the percentage on the remainder would fall to still lower figures.
The second table attached clearly shows a similar tendency for
incomes between $50,000 and $100,000 in spite of an increase in salaries
subject to tax in those groups, amounting to about 150 per cent. in
1920 and 90 per cent. in 1921.
Unless this condition can be remedied, surely the continuance of
the present high surtaxes is indefensible. And study of the subject
leads to the conclusion that the present situation is not due mainly to
defects in the form of the present law, although some defects exist
which could be remedied with benefit to the revenue. The difficulty lies
far deeper. The distinction between capital and income is at best
difficult to draw, and the complexities of modern business have greatly
enhanced this difficulty. Tax laws must be specific and according
to well-settled rules of construction must be interpreted strictly—any
ambiguities being resolved in favor of the taxpayer. The form of every
business transaction, and indeed whether the transaction shall or shall
not take place, is determined by the taxpayer and his decision is reached
with a knowledge of the tax law and is usually framed so as to produce
the greatest possible profit after taking taxes into consideration.
The difference in taxation between corporations and individuals
alone creates an almost insoluble difficulty. The ease with which incor
poration and disincorporation are effected; the difficulty of making
laws and regulations governing corporations which will apply with equal
justice to the large public corporation and the small private corporation,
which practically represents an individual fortune, and the further fact
that between these two extremes there are innumerable gradations, so
that it is impossible to draw hard-and-fast lines and to treat corporations
on one side of the line in one way and corporations on the other side
of the line in another—these and other such conditions make it
impossible for legislation ever to do more than temporarily check the
increase of tax avoidance, so long as the inducements to tax avoidance
are so compelling as they are today in the case of all those possessing
more than a very moderate income.
If it were possible to lay down a few broad principles and leave the
administration of the surtax to the discretion of a highly competent
taxing authority which could be governed by the substance rather than
the form of the transaction, it might conceivably be possible to admin
ister the surtaxes on the present scale with some measure of efficiency.
This is, however, impossible and under any other conditions the form
rather than the substance inevitably determines the tax and the form is
selected by the taxpayer so as to defeat the tax.
The continuance of the high surtaxes therefore means an unedifying
contest of wits between the tax avoider and his advisers on the one side
and Congress and the Treasury on the other—with all the advantages on
the side of the tax avoider and with those who are unwilling or, like
most earners, unable to avoid taxes, caught between the two and bearing
the brunt of the conflict. Congress must legislate in advance and on
broad lines to meet all conditions. The tax avoider acts after Congress
has taken its position and deals with specific proposed transactions,
capable of infinite variation in form and time to meet the rules laid
down by the legislature. Naturally the result of the conflict is as
disappointing to the Treasury as it is demoralizing to the taxpayer.
Whatever may be possible in time of war, all experience shows that
it is impossible in times of peace to levy surtaxes on any such scale as
is now in force with any degree of efficiency or with any approach to

71

The Journal of Accountancy
equity. I am convinced that readjustment of the surtaxes will ultimately
benefit the revenue as well as the business of the country and will
make taxation far more equitable. I hope, therefore, that your Com
mittee will favorably regard the secretary’s proposals on this as well as
on other points.
I am sending copies of this letter to Senator Smoot and to the
secretary.
Respectfully,

Comparison of total incomes and of incomes over $100,000 by sources for
the years 1916, 1920 and 1921, based on “Statistics of Income,” published
by treasury department.
* * * * *
(Note: Incomes under $3,000 are omitted in all cases in order to make
comparison on the same basis possible.)
(Millions
-------of dollars)
1916
3,390
Business, etc.*
2,136
Dividends
Rents and royalties 644
Interest and
702
miscellaneous
Gross income (except
sal. and wages)
6,872
General deductions 2,051
Net income (except
sal. and wages)
4,821
Salaries and wages 1,478
Net income—total
6,299

—Over $100,000Total -------- —Amount— —% of total—
1921 1916 1920 1921 1916 1920 1921
1920
863 260 136 25.4 5.4 4.6
4,709 2,952
2,584 2,145
944 465 332 44.2 18.0 15.5
669
699
80 32 24 12.5 4.6 3.6

1,235

1,094

9,227
2,382

6,860
2,134

6,845 4,726
6,656 5,691
13,501 10,417

181

104

65 26.3

8.4

5.9

2,068 861 557
333 239 163

30.1 9.3
16.2 10.0

8.1
7.7

1,735 622 394
121 105 69
1,856 727 463

36.0
8.1
29.5

8.3
1.2
4.5

9.1
1.6
5.4

Comparative numbers of personal income-tax returns
1916, 1920, 1921.

* * * * *
Income
classes

10 to 20M........ ........
Over 20M........ ........
“
50M........ ........
' “
70M........ ........
“
100M........ ........
“ 200M........ ........
“
300M........ ........

No. of
returns
1916
67,927
53,772
17,085
10,916
6,633
2,449
1,296

No. of
returns
1920
148,101
78,019
15,742
7,951
3,649
868
395

%of
1916
218
145
92
73
55
35
30

No. of
returns
1921
114,244
58,115
11,069
5,398
2,352
535
246

% of
1916

168
108
65
49
35
22
19

(Note) Total income reported for all classes was
in 1916 $ 6,299,000,000
1920 13,501,000,000, or 214% of 1916
1921 10,417,000,000, or 165% of 1916
*This heading includes income from businesses, professions and vocations, fidu
ciaries, and profits on sales of property. Subdivision of the total is impracticable on
account of changes in classification in the statistics.
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“Deductible Losses under the Revenue Act of 1918”
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: Taxpayers are watching with considerable interest the decisions
of our courts on the question of the right of the treasury to disallow
“paper” losses under the revenue act of 1918 in cases where such losses
were not actually sustained as compared with cost. In conformity with the
instructions upon the returns and the regulations then in force, as well as
in accordance with the plain intent and language of the law as universally
understood and interpreted at the time, thousands of persons claimed
deductions when property was sold below its March 1, 1913, value irre
spective of original cost. The treasury, however, at a later date (June,
1921), in reliance upon a brief filed by the solicitor general in the cases
of Goodrich v. Edwards and Walsh v. Brewster, reversed its former con
struction of the law and amended its regulations so that deductible losses
were restricted to the difference between selling price and cost, using the
March 1, 1913, value as a basis only if lower than cost. Numerous addi
tional assessments have been levied and collected upon these grounds,
covering the years 1918, 1919, and 1920.
In the aforementioned brief, the solicitor conceded that no tax could
lawfully be assessed upon an apparent gain arising from the use of the
March 1, 1913, value as a base unless a profit to that extent had actually
been realized, using original cost as a base. He further contended, how
ever, that as the same language was employed by congress in specifying
what should constitute the basis of deductible losses, the same rule should
apply to both. While the supreme court did not then and has not yet
passed upon this point, the solicitor’s opinion has been upheld by one of
the lower courts—the district court of the United States, eastern district
of Pennsylvania, in the case of Ludington v. McCaughn, collector, pub
lished in T. D. 3496 and quoted in full on page 290 of The Journal of
Accountancy for October, 1923. This court was able to find that “con
gress did not intend to impose a tax on a mere fictitious or paper profit,
or to permit the deduction of a mere fictitious or paper loss.”
In spite of the high authority thus supporting the position of the
treasury department, the writer believes the plausible contention made to
be unsound because of failure to give due weight to the force of original
executive construction of the 1918 act and its predecessor act and to the
legislative confirmation thereof. It is common knowledge that the treasury
construed the section of the 1916 law relating to both gains and losses to
mean that the March 1, 1913, value should be used as a basis without
considering cost. This construction and the administration of the law
thereunder, were well known to congress when the revenue act of 1918
was enacted. Yet that law, in substance, repeated the provisions of the
former act on this point. The intent of the legislature could not be more
clearly shown. The treasury department, in the Internal Revenue Bulletin
of December 25, 1922, refers to the “well-known rule of statutory con
struction that the reënactment by congress, without change, of a statute
which has previously received executive construction, is an adoption by
congress of such construction.” This principle was also recognized in
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Edwards v. Wabash Railway Co. (264 Fed. 610) in the following language:
“Where a statute that has been construed by the courts has been reenacted
in the same or substantially the same terms, the legislature is presumed to
have been familiar with its construction, and to have adopted it as a part
of the law, unless a different intention is indicated; and the same prin
ciple is applied to statutes and parts of statutes which have been reënacted
after they have been construed by the legislative or executive departments
of the government.”
That the 1918 act, insofar as it related to the point at issue, was a
reënactment of the 1916 act, is admitted by the Pennsylvania court in the
above-mentioned case, as the following extracts from the decision will
show: “The questions decided in these cases (Walsh v. Brewster and
Goodrich v. Edwards') had to do with gains, not losses, and the cases arose
under the income-tax law of 1916. But the provisions of that act on this
question differed only in arrangement and not in substance with the act
of 1918. . . . Thus, under the act of 1916, losses were to be computed
in the same way as gains, and these provisions were substantially reënacted
in section 202 of the act of 1918.”
The purpose of congress in the 1918 act to tax gains and allow losses
in the manner its plain language “standing alone” indicated, is thus abso
lutely established by its adoption of the executive construction given to
the former act. The treasury continued for more than two years to con
strue the 1918 law as it had construed the 1916 law, and no one suggested
that the will of the legislative branch of the government was not being
carried out. Certain taxpayers, however, questioned the power of congress
to impose a tax upon gains based solely upon March 1, 1913, values; it
was contended that the same did not constitute “income” as defined by
the supreme court and therefore were not within the scope of the sixteenth
amendment. This contention was upheld in the Goodrich and Brewster
cases, although manifestly contrary to the legislative will adopted “as
a part of the law.”
But the rule that the constitutionality of statutes must be presumed
whenever possible is paramount even over legislative construction; and
hence the supreme court was impelled, in regard to gains, to overrule
congress and interpret the words of the act in a way to avoid the consti
tutional inhibition. It was therefore held that as other portions of the
law expressed the intent to tax income only, and as gains based on the
March 1, 1913, value were not income except to the extent that profits had
been realized over cost, such other provisions must be read in connection
with the section in regard to the use of the March 1, 1913, value as a base.
It was upon this ground only that the narrow construction was given to
the plain language of the act as it related to gains.
There is, however, no constitutional limitation upon the allowance of
losses and no reason to overrule the interpretation of the law adopted by
congress as expressing its will with reference thereto. The power to
permit deductions is, in effect, practically unrestricted, and congress “could
allow taxpayers to deduct 150 per cent. of losses if it cared to, but could
not increase taxable income one per cent.” (Montgomery, Income-tax
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Procedure, 1923, page 927). In view of the diametrically opposed rules of
construction thus necessarily applicable, the argument that the language
used in the two cases, though similar, implies a purpose on the part of the
legislature to treat gains and losses alike is untenable. In other words,
it is illogical to maintain that words referring to gains, limited by the
presumed intent to tax income only, have precisely the same meaning as
identical words referring to losses, not limited by any presumed intent.
The true doctrine involved is that in both instances the declared will of
congress must be carried out as far as is constitutionally permissible.
It is vain to reason that congress would not have permitted apparent
losses to be deducted if it had known that the supreme court would not
permit it to tax apparent gains, or to say what would have been done under
any other varying circumstances. The same Pennsylvania court in a
previous decision (Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lederer, collector, quoted on
page 16, of Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 52, volume I, December 25, 1922),
said in part: “If congress had taxed one thing the tax cannot be extended
to another thing by the executive nor by the courts merely because it is
thought that the other thing ought to be taxed or that the purpose or
intention of congress was to tax it. The question is not what the courts
think should have been taxed or what congress, by its indicated general
purpose, intended to tax, but what has been taxed”; also “that a lawful
tax must have its rise in the will of congress and not in the inferences
drawn from such expressed will by the executive or the judiciary.” It is
obvious that the assertion that gains and losses were to be treated in the
same manner is mere inference and such intention is nowhere indicated
in the act. In fact, the law distinctly specifies that the holding of any
part of the act as unconstitutional “shall not affect, impair, or invalidate
the remainder of the act, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause,
sentence, paragraph, or part thereof directly involved in the controversy
in which such judgment has been rendered” (sec. 1402). The wishes of
the lawmakers could hardly be more clearly apparent than in the present
case.
In view of the plain language of the statute, the original interpretation
of it by the treasury and the general public, the adoption of such construc
tion by congress in reënacting the law in substantially the same terms
knowing how the law was being administered, the constitutional limitation
which forces the narrow interpretation of the clause referring to the use
of the March 1, 1913, value as a basis for computing gains and the absence
of such limitation when applied to losses, and the fact that congress itself
in the statute indicated its desire that the declaration of the unconstitu
tionality of any part of the act should apply solely to that part and not
to any other part, it would seem that taxpayers were fully within their
rights in claiming a deduction for losses based upon March 1, 1913, values.
A decision of the supreme court on this point will be awaited with great
interest.
Yours truly,
Gordon C. Carson.
Savannah, Georgia.

75

